Control over state properties by countries that providefinancial aid would incentivize southern European economiesto repay their loans by Doomen, Jasper
blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/07/16/state-control-country-properties/
Control over state properties by countries that provide
financial aid would incentivize southern European economies
to repay their loans.
Jul 16 2012
The Eurozone’s northern leaders face a dilemma – imposing further austerity on the stricken southern
economies, such as Spain, Greece and Italy may have severe consequences for the richer north, but every
concession made erodes their credibility. Jasper Doomen argues for an alternative: Countries that provide
financial aid to the stricken southern European economies should be given control over state properties if the
borrowers do not repay their loans. This would reverse the current power relationship and encourage the
countries of the south to work on improving their economies.
The latest short-time solution to mitigate the economic problems the European countries face consists in
directly aiding banks that are in trouble. Is the proposed bank recapitalization a first step towards actually
resolving the crisis, or is a more solid alternative necessary?
Until now, financial support has been provided at the national level, which has hardly been a successful
approach, as one can now (with the benefit of hindsight) ascertain. The decision reached at the EU summit
earlier this month to bypass national governments and make payments directly to the banks is certainly a
different but not necessarily a superior approach. Of course, banks will be supervised. Yet considering what
is at stake, this outcome is downright disappointing (though not for everyone: Spain’s Prime Mariano Minister
Rajoy could barely hide his contentment). No structural solutions have been presented, or even a view
towards accomplishing them.
More important, however, is the fact that the pressure on the countries to implement reforms in order to
combat the budget deficits has been reduced. That this was the outcome of the negotiations is not surprising.
Discussing a solution with Spain and Italy resembles negotiating with someone who threatens to jump off a
cliff whilst chained to the other negotiators. His suicide or damage will have serious consequences for
everyone else as well. These countries don’t want to go ‘bankrupt’ but they know their downfall will gravely
affect the relatively strong countries, and they seem to have become experts in exploiting their stranglehold
over them. This negotiation pattern is similar (if not virtually identical) toGreece’s strategy, and in the bleakest
scenario, a country such asFrancewill resort to it as well, especially with the current president in place.
The dilemma is clear: the southern European countries have to economize while a large part of the population
already faces grave financial problems. An additional problem for (northern) politicians is their credibility,
which erodes with each concession they make. Chancellor Merkel has stood her ground as a veritable
contemporary Iron Lady, but this position will be difficult to maintain if enough countries are able to profit from
Europe’s weaknesses (which are, ironically, the outcome of a desire to make Europe as a whole a strong
organization; it seems, pace Lincoln, that a house divided against itself can stand, albeit unsteadily –
incidentally, the comparison of north against south comes to mind).
How can this impasse be resolved? Are there only two positions (either a United States of Europe or the road
towards more sovereignty than is now the case, i.e., a return to the European Economic Community), or is a
third option available? It has been proposed to grant countries loans only if they are able to provide some
security, which has been ridiculed by some. It is unclear, however, why this could not be a workable
procedure. The basic idea is that the countries that provide financial aid should receive control over state
properties to the amount they have lent if the borrowers do not pay the money back.
This control means that the lenders may use the profits that come from these properties (which may range
from museum fees to gas revenues). Such profits are (fully or partly) paid to the borrowers if they sin no more
and do what is demanded of them. In time, when their affairs are in order, they will be able to buy back the
control of these properties. This means, effectively, a state of wardship. If this sounds harsh, consider that
the alternative is that such states can continue imposing their will on the others until they will all share the
same fate, waiting for China to take over the entire continent and sell it for scraps.
In any event, the new situation means that the power relationship is reversed, thus nullifying the ‘suicide’
threat. To use another simile: it is as if all countries share a boat together that continues to show new leaks
which the southern countries are unwilling to mend, knowing that the northern countries have far more to gain
from it than they do. This means, in the long run, that the boat (the European monetary union) may continue
to exist but in a seriously weakened condition, which may still be considered preferable to the southern
countries (in the short term, in any event) to carrying out the demands made by the northern countries, for the
simple reason that all countries are in it together, so to speak.
The solution amounts to dividing the boat in two (without resorting to dividing the Euro itself into two (or even
more than two) currencies, which may be an – albeit costly – option in the worst scenario), so that it is in the
benefit of the southern countries themselves to start working on making the necessary repairs, lest they wind
up with nothing more than driftwood. The solution is, by the way, not without benefits for the countries in
trouble themselves. Future loans can be granted relatively easily (because the lenders will have more security
than is now the case), which means that the borrowers face fewer negative economic effects and can more
easily ‘sell’ the new policy to their own populations.
The greatest problem remains that of enforceability. A ‘moral’ appeal on the borrowers to show solidarity with
the lenders is equally nonsensical as one made to lenders to provide means in the first place, since this
solidarity is as artificial as it gets (and thus meaningless). The alternative is to convince the politicians of the
borrowers that a solid policy for the long-term is the only viable approach. In a democracy, with new elections
constantly looming, such an appeal may fall on deaf ears, but the prospects of the erection of a statue in
compensation for their great deeds may sufficiently appeal to their vanity. In general, one must ask oneself
whether a monetary union that wants to take itself seriously can afford to fail to propose clear and enforceable
measures such as those suggested above.
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